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- HERDON THE STREET:
INFORMATIONAL INEFFICIENCIES IN A MARKET WITH SHORT-TERM SPECULATION
A3STRACT
Standardmodels of informed speculation suggest that traders try to learn infor-
mation that others do not have. This result implicitly relies on the assumption
that speculators have long horizons, i.e, can hold the asset forever. By contrast,
we show that if speculators have short horizons, they may herd on the same in-
formation, trying to learn what other informed traders also know. There can be
multiple herding equilibria, and herding speculators may even choose to study
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How do speculators' trading horizons affect the informativeness of asset prices? Does
a market with numerous short-horizon traders perform less efficiently than one in which
traders buy and hold? The classical response is that if speculators are rational, trading
horizons should not affect asset prices. Even if a trader plans to sell his stock in five
minutes, he cares about the expected price at that time. That price, in turn, depends on
the expected price five minutes hence, and so on. Simple backwards induction then assures
that even very short-horizon traders behave as if they were speculating on fundamentals.
This traditional reasoning seems at odds with the way professional traders describe
their jobs. Traders often emphasize that their objective is to predict near-term changes in
asset prices. Rationally, they focus on learning anything that will help them do this more
effectively. Often, it is claimed, such information has little to do with fundamentals. For
example, according to one foreign exchange trader:1
Ninety percent of what we do is based on perception. It doesn't matter if that
perception is right or wrong or real. It only matters that other people in the
market believe it. I may know it's crazy, I may think it's wrong. But I lose my
shirt by ignoring it. This business turns on decisions made in seconds. If you wait
a minute to reflect on things, you're lost. I can't afford to be five steps ahead of
everybody else in the market. That's suicide.
This account corresponds closely to the skeptical view of short-term trading offered
by Keynes (1936) in the General Theory:
The actual, private object of most skilled investment today is to "beat the gun..."
This battle of wits to anticipate the basis of conventional valuation a few months
hence, rather than the prospective yield of an investment over a long term of
years, does not even require gulls amongst the public to feed the maws of the
professional; it can be played by professionals amongst themselves.
Keynes goes on to compare professional investors to beauty-contest judges who vote on the
basis of expected popularity with other judges, and not on the basis of absolute beauty.
In this paper, we develop a model of short-term trading that accords closely with
these informal descriptions. We start with the assumption that there are at least some
Quotation from thehead offoreign exchange operations at Manufacturen Hanover Trust, 'Making aook on the Buck,
Mossberg, WellStreet .Journal 5eptember23, 1988.
1speculators who prefer to trade over short horizons. While we could explicitly model
the rational behavior that gives rise to this assumption, in this paper we choose to take
speculative horizons as given, and focus instead on the implications of short-term trading.2
We then show that the existence of short-term speculators can lead to informational
inefficiencies. This occurs even though our model features fully rational traders. To see how
such inefficiencies can arise, consider an informed trader who plans to liquidate his position
in the near future, before any public news arrives. He can profit on his information only if
it is subsequently impounded into the price by the trades of similarly-informed speculators.
The trader therefore is made better off if there are others in the market acting on the same
information that he is.
Positive informational spillovers of this sort are evident in the quotes above. In Keynes'
beauty contest, the judges would be better off if they could coordinate their choices, even
if they coordinate on somebody who is less than beautiful. Likewise, short-horizon traders
would be better off if they could coordinate their research efforts on the same piece of
information, even if that information is less revealing about the asset's long-run value. This
is in sharp contrast with most information-based asset pricing models (which implicitly
assume a long horizon) .Inthese models the informational spillover is negative: a given
trader is made better off if nobody else is trading on his information.
As will become clear, negative spillovers ensure informational efficiency when traders
have long horizons.4 Negative spillovers lead to contrarian research behavior, which is es-
sential for asset market efficiency. To take a concrete example, suppose that two variables,
a and b, provide equally useful information about the value of a given security, and that an
individual trader has the capacity to learn about either a or 6, but not both. Informational
efficiency requires that half of the traders study a, and the other half study 6. And this is
exactly what happens if traders have long horizons, If more than half are studying a, then
2 aretwo reasons why it might he rational for speculatore to choose to trade over short horizons. First, some speculators
such as money managers may need to prove to their clients or bosses that they are skilled investors. Promises of gains teo
years hence would hardly justify a high current salary or the authority to continue managing a large portfolio. (see Narayanan
t585 and Holmstrom and Ricart i costa, t9a6.) 5econd, speculators who face imperfections in the capital market may find it
relatively costly to finance long-horizon investment strategies. In particular, if speculators tie up their money in long-horizon
investments, and at some point become credit constrained, they will not be able to take advantage of investment opportunities
that ariee in the future.(see5hleifer and vishny,19a9.)
25ee,forexample. Grossman (1916), Ifellwig (1980), and verrechia (1982).
'For a discussion of spillover effects, see cooper and John (1s88).
2a is more heavily impounded in the price than b. This negative spillover in a reduces the
profits to those who study a, and so leads some investors to study b. However, with short
horizons, the outcome can be very different. Suppose everybody decides to study variable
a. This can be an equilibrium, since there is no incentive to study b: even though b will
affect the value of the asset when it is eventually liquidated, it will not be in its price in
the near term, as nobody is trading on b information.
Thus, one sort of inefficiency created by short-horizon speculation is that traders
may all tend to focus on one source of information, rather than on a diverse set of data.
Moreover, the informational spillovers can be so powerful that groups of traders may choose
to focus on very poor quality data, or even on completely extraneous variables that bear
no relation at all to fundamentals.
Although its mechanism is very different, our model is not the first that attempts
to capture Keynes' beauty-contest insight about the distinction between short and long
trading horizons. Bubble models (Tirole, 1982; Blanchard and Watson, 1985) address
the same basic phenomenon. So does the model of positive feedback trading by DeLong,
Summers, Shleifer and Waidman (1990b). We will comment on these and other related
work in what follows.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out our basic model. Section 3
derives a series of propositions relating to the informational efficiency of asset prices when
traders have long and short horizons. We show that with short horizons, there can be
"herding" on particular sources of information. In Section 4 we show that with sufficiently
short horizons, speculators will trade on, and actually choose to study, completely extra-
neous noise. Section 5 then relates our model to other work on the inefficiency of asset
markets. Section 5 also discusses extensions and implications of our model, stressing the
connection between short speculative horizons and short-term corporate behavior.
32. The Model
We consider trade in a market for a single asset which has a fixed supply. The asset's
only payout is a liquidating dividend of v, which is the sum of two normally distributed
random variables:
v=a+b, (1)
where a and b have means of zero and variances of a and c, respectively.
2.1. Types of traders
The analysis takes as its starting point Kyle's (1985) model of informed trading.
There are three types of traders in this model, all of whom are risk-neutral and none of
whom can observe v perfectly. The first type of traders are market makers who fill the
orders of the two other types of traders: speculators and liquidity traders. Speculators
and liquidity traders submit ("market") orders to buy (sell) the asset from (to) long-
lived market makers. Market makers cannot distinguish speculators' informed orders from
liquidity traders' uninformed orders; they can observe only the total "order flow". Because
they are risk neutral and competitive, they earn zero profits. Thus, the market clearing
price is the market makers' expectation of v, conditional on what they learn about v from
the overall order flow. Since market makers do not have private information and are willing
to hold until liquidation, they are best thought of as an uninformed fringe of long-term
traders.
There are n speculators, n0 of whom have observed a and n6 of whom have observed
b. Below, we allow speculators to choose which piece of information to become informed
about, thereby endogenizing n0 and n6. We assume that each speculator can costlessly
observe a or b, but not both. This is intended to capture the idea that there are limits to
how much any one trader can learn over short periods of time.5
As in the Kyle model, speculators are large enough to affect the market price and
they take this into account when formulating their demands. If speculators did not an-
ticipate their effect on price, they would want to take infinite long (short) positions when
—
51twould also be easy to endogenise thetotal number of epeculatn, N. Wecould, for example, assume that there are costs
of becoming informed about a or 6, and that then costs duSt depending oo how readily available the information is. If then
is free entry into speculation, tradora will then enter until their profits net of information-acquisition costs are driven to zero.
4their price forecast is below (above) their forecast of value. While the assumption is an
attractive simplifying feature of the model, it is by no means crucial. We could also as-
sume that speculators are risk averse and behave competitively (although such a model is
computationally more burdensome). Thus, the reader should not be misled into thinking
that our results come from some form of market manipulation by a large strategic trader.
Liquidity traders, in contrast to speculators, have inelastic demands for the asset:
they wish to buy or sell a fixed quantity regardless of its price. Liquidity traders play
an important role in essentially all models of information acquisition (see, for example,
Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980, and Kyle, 1985). In their absence, prices would reveal all
the information in the economy, so there would be no returns to becoming informed. In
our model, as in others, liquidity trades result in prices that are noisy indicators of v, thus
creating returns to information.
2.2. Timing of trade
At an initial date 0, the n speculators choose whether to become informed about a
or about b.Followingthis decision there are three trading periods. At date 1, speculators
submit their asset demands. We assume that half of the traders have their orders executed
at date 1 and that the other half have their orders executed at date 2. At the time they
submit their orders, traders do not know at what date their orders will be executed. This
assumption captures the notion that there are limits to how many trades can be executed
at any point in time. More importantly for our analysis, the assumption implies that
speculators' information is only gradually incorporated into prices. As we will see below,
trades that are executed at date 1 can be profitable because more (of the same) information
arrives at date 2. Traders that "beat the gun" are therefore able to profit.
All speculators close out their positions at date 3. As we explain below, this means
that they have short horizons in that they may unwind their position before information
is publicly released. What matters here is that the price at which informed traders get out
of the market, even when they have short horizons, may contain more information than
the price at which they get in.
Liquidity traders have date-i and date-2 demands of c1 and 2'respectively.At time
53 they also unwind their positions, so that €3 =—(€ +€2). We assume that q and €2 are
normally distributed with mean zero and variance o.
Given these assumptions, the order flow at date t, Ft, for t =1,2,can be written:
a "b Ft = + + Ct,
whereq and q6 are the equilibrium demands of speculators informed about a and b,
respectively.
Because the order flow at date 3 is just the negative of the cumulative order flows at
dates 1 and 2, trade at date 3 contains no new information about v. All traders are simply
closing out their positions from the previous two periods. This assumption simplifies the
exposition greatly, but is of no qualitative importance. If, for example, we were to assume
that liquidity traders at dates 1 and 2 did not close out their positions and that c was, like
earlier realizations, drawn independently, there would be additional confirming evidence
about v in date-3 orders. As a result, informed traders whose trades were executed at date
2 would have positive expected profits when they closed out their positions. All of our
results continue to hold (at least qualitatively) under this alternative assumption about
date-3 trade.
Our main objective is to consider the effects of short versus long speculative horizons.
To do this in a simple way, we assume that with probability a, the dividend is publicly
announced at date 3, so that the date-3 trading price is v. With probability 1— a, however,
v does not become public until date 4. In that case, at date 3 the risk-neutral market
makers simply reabsorb the supply of the asset and hold it until v is paid. The date-3
price is then equal to their conditional expectation of v, which -- sinceno information
is contained in the date-3 flow —isequal to the price from date 2. This specification of
the trading horizon allows us to consider the important special cases in which informed
speculators have purely long horizons (a =1)and purely short horizons (a =0).
It should be noted that when speculators close out their positions at date 3 (and v
is not publicly announced), they transact only with the uninformed market makers —not
with a new set of informed short-term traders. If a new group of informed traders were to
enter at date 3, they would wish to learn about both components of u, because they would
6be holding until liquidation. This would cause the date-3 price to reflect information about
both of these components, much as if there had been a public release of news at date 3.
Thus, in the current formulation of the model, assuming that a new batch of informed
traders enter at date 3 is similar to assuming long horizons for the first group of informed
traders —ourresults are overturned and informational efficiency is restored.
At first glance, this casts some doubt on the general applicability of the results. How-
ever, this second group of informed traders has such a strong effect only because they hold
the asset until its liquidation with certainty. In Section 5.1, we argue that a more realis-
tic (although more complex) steady-state version of the model would likely yield results
similar to those we present below, without restrictions on the entry of new generations of
informed traders.
2.3. Market-Maker Pricing Rules
Based on the observed order flows and their conjectures about the trading strategies
of the speculators, market makers form beliefs about the expected value of the asset. Since
q0 and q depend on the realized values of a and b, the order flows provide information
about v. Given that market makers' priors are normally distributed around a mean of
zero, their posterior belief having seen the date-i order flow, F1, is just F1 multiplied by
some constant, A1. This constant is equal to the probability limit of the coefficient in a
regression of v on F1. Thus, the price at date 1, P1 equals A1F1, where





Similarly, the date-2 order flow provides information about the value of the asset.
Given that the component of the order flow due to speculators' demands is the same at
dates 1 and 2, and that the variances of e are the same for the two periods, market makers
put equal weight on these two order flows in forming their expectations about the asset's
value at date 2. Thus, the market makers' conditional expectation of v is a function of the
average order flow: P2= A2(F1+ F2)/2, where




var[!qa++ (i + €2)]
(
7Since the information about v in the combined order flow is more precise than the infor-
mation in F1 alone, A2 >A1.Of course, the equilibrium value of A depends on the trading
strategies of the informed speculators, and these trading strategies, in turn, depend on the
way in which the market maker sets prices.
2.4. Speculators' demands
Speculators' demands depend on the information they observe. In forming their de-
mands they take as given the number ofspeculators who are informed about a and b, the
trading strategies of these speculators, and the pricing strategy of the market maker.
Consider then the decision facing speculator i who has observed a. First suppose that
the dividend is to be announced at date 3. Since the speculator's order of q is equally
likely to be executed at date 1 as at date 2, he expects to purchase at the average price,
2421. Expected profits on each unit purchased are then E[v —(Pi+ P2) I a. Next
suppose that no announcement is made at date 3. If the order is executed at date 1, the
speculator earns E[p2 —pjIa], whereas if the order is executed at date 2 he earns nothing
since he buys at P2 and sells at date 3 at a price of p2. Thus, in the case where the dividend
is not announced until date 4, the speculators expected profits are E[p2 —p1]a]. Since the
dividend is announced at date 3 with probability a and at date 4 with probability 1 —a,
the expected utility of speculator i conditional on the realization of a is:
i i IP1+P2\ P2P1 U=q0EaI\v—2)+(1—a) 2 a , (5)
where q is speculator i's demand.
The expectation of v for a speculator who has observed a is just a. The observed
value of a also enables the speculator to forecast prices at dates 1 and 2, since he knows
the realization of a and the trading strategies of the other speculators who have observed
a. However, he knows nothing of the order flow generated either by liquidity traders or
by speculators who have observed b. These flows have zero mean conditional on a. Thus,
if the speculator's order is executed at time t, his expectation of the price at that time,
E]pt]a], is given by:
E[ptla] =AtE[FtIa]= At(q+(_1)4), (6)
8where a denotes the conjectured demands of the —1 other speculators who are informed
about a and have their orders executed at date t.6Incontrast, the speculator's expectation
of the price at time, a, assuming his order is not executed at time a is
E[p,Ia=A3E[F31a]= Asja. (7)
Since speculator i's order is not executed at time a, the orders ofother speculators are
executed and he has no effect on price. Given these expectations, speculator i who has







Thisexpression shows clearly how trade by other speculators who observe a has
spillover effects on the utility of speculator i who also observes a. If informed traders
have long-term horizons (i.e., a = 1) ,everythingelse being equal, more trade by other
similarly informed speculators lowers speculator i's expected utility:<0. Negative
spillovers like these are standard in most information-based asset pricing models. Each
agent expects to gain only to the extent that he can trade on information that is not
already incorporated into price.
By contrast, if speculators have short horizons, and therefore liquidate their holdings
dU'
before v is realized, spillovers are positive. In this case (a = 0),>0.To see why this
is so, consider the extreme case in which speculator i is the only one who trades on his
information about a. He cannot hope to earn a profit since there is no way for a to get
impounded further into the price before he liquidates his holdings.
If, however, other speculators who are informed about a trade aggressively, speculator
i will earn profits if his order is executed at date 1. This occurs because a great deal of
additional information about a is later impounded in the date-2 price, and speculator i
will unwind his position at this price. Thus, if the speculator cannot hold the asset until
it is liquidated, his expected profits increase in the amount of trade by similarly informed
'Note that we aecumefromthe outset that the demands of all other speculators informed about a are equal. Thus, we are
focusing on symmetric equilibria.
9traders. Taking the demands of other "a-speculators" and the market depth parameters
and A2 as given, the first-order condition for q is:
2aa +((1 — a)(a(A2— A1)+ A1) —a(A1+ A2)(— i))q
(9 2(A1+aA2)
We can derive an analogous expression for speculators who are informed about b, replacing
a with b throughout.
Equation (9) shows that if a-speculators hold the asset until liquidation (which occurs
with probability a), their demands are "strategic substitutes" in the terminology of Bulow,
Geanakoplos, and Kiemperer (1985). As other traders become more aggressive, not only
do i's expected profits fall (due to the negative spillover), but i also trades less: holding
all else constant,= —(— 1)(Ai+ A2) <0.This derives from the fact that more
information about a is already in the price and so the marginal returns from trading on a
are lower.7
The more interesting case is when speculators liquidate their holdings before the
dividend is known (a =0).In that case, demands are "strategic complements". When
rival speculators trade more aggressively, each speculator wishes to trade more aggressively
as well: j&(A2
—A1)+ A1 >0.The marginal return from trading increases because
more news about a will be in the price when speculators sell, and thus they stand to gain
more at that time. In general, trading by similarly informed speculators is more likely to
be a strategic complement the smaller is a. Strategic complementarity of this sort is the
crucial feature of our model and it gives rise to the herding equilibria that we focus on
below.8
7Many economic games exhibit strategic substitutability, most notably the Cournot model of product-market competition.
When an industry rivet increase, its production all firma reduce their production becausethe market price islower and hence
the marginal returns from production are lower.
Strategic complementarities are present in numerous other model, including the product-market model of Bertrand compe-
tition with differentiated good.. In that model, firms lower their prices in respon.e to rival.' price decrease,: in contrast to the
Cournot model, a firm becomes more aggreesive in re.pon.e to increased aggreesivene.. by rival,. But note that while our model
has po.itive spillovers, the Bertrand model has negative .pillover. in that a rival', more aggreve pricing .trategy lowers the
firm', expected profit.. In this sense, our model is closest to the technology adoption models of Farrell and Saloner (198S) and
Kata and Shapiro (1985) which feature both strategic complementaritie. and positive spillovers: firms are made better off when
others adopt the same technology and this lead, them to coordinate their technology choice.. Another example is Scharfstein
and Stein (1990) who show that reputational concern, in the labor market can generatepositiveepillovers in investment and
generate herd behavior among corporate managers. Spillovers and Strategic complementarities in financial market. have also
been explored. For example, Admati and Pfieiderer (1989) presit a model in which liquidity trader, prefer to trade at the same
time as oth& liquidity traders while Pagano (1989) show, that they wieh to trade in the same market. These agglomeration
effects mitigate the adverse selection problan that liquidity trader, typically face. -
103. Equilibrium
In order to solve for the equilibrium of this game, we first focus on the "trading sub-
game" which takes na and n6 as given. Then we move to the earlier research stage of
the game and allow traders to choose which source of information to study. The solution
to this research game endogenizes aandb•Inequilibrium, the expected utilities of
active a- and b-speculators are equalized; otherwise speculators would choose to study
the information source that provides the higher expected utility. By itself, however, this
condition on equilibrium turns out to be too weak: it allows for the possibility of inherently
unstable outcomes. Thus, we impose an additional stability condition: if one speculator
deviates and studies the other information source, others playing that strategy do not wish
follow and deviate as well.
The main focus of this section is whether equilibrium in the research stage is infor-
mationally efficient: Do traders choose to learn about the right mix of information —that
which maximizes the informativeness of prices —ordo they herd together, focusing on
the same variable? In our model, prices fully reflect all publicly available information; the
price is equal to the market makers' best guess of value given their information about order
flows. But, speculators' research choices do not necessarily maximize the informativeness
of equilibrium prices. Below we show that when trading horizons are short, speculators'
research decisions are grossly inefficient: all speculators study either a or bdespitethe fact
that it is more informationaily efficient for some speculators to study a while others study
b.Westart, however, by establishing that in the traditional model in which speculators
have long horizons, the research equilibrium is informationally efficient. We then com-
pare this with the inefficiency when a =0and present some preliminary examples when
0 <a<1.
3.1.Equilibriumwith long horizons
To solve for speculators' asset demands when they have long horizons we set a =1
in equation (9) and in the analogous expression for b-speculators. Recall that we are
first focusing on the sub-game once n and n6 have been determined. In a symmetric





wheret5a is deffned by the equation. Similarly, in equilibrium,
q6 =
(A1+ A2)(! + 1)
51b, (11)
The variables 5a and 66 measure the aggressiveness with which a- and b-speculators trade.
These equations only tell us speculators' demands given their conjectures about A1
and A2 chosen by the market makers. But, the chosen A1 and A2 themselves depend on
speculators' trading strategies. As discussed above, A1 is just the probability limit of the
regression coefficient of v on F1:
2(naöaa+ flb6bC)
12
n2aöa2aa2+ flö + 4
Recall that 5a and b depend on both A1 and A2 so that this equation alone does not
determine A1. A similar expression holds for A2:
2(no6oo + flb6b) A2= . 13 nög + nö + 2a
We have not been able to derive closed form expressions for the endogenous -variables
A1, A2, 6, and 6b However, it is worth noting from equations (12) and (13) that A2 is
greater than A1 as we claimed earlier.
-
Providedthe four equations, (10) -(13),have a solution, we can calculate the expected
utilities of a- and b-speculators for any fixed n0 and n6. Denote these expected utilities
EU0 and EU1, respectively. Note that these expected utilities are calculated before a and
b are realized and are not to be confused with a speculator's expected utility conditional
on observing a.
Given the expected utilities that follow from an arbitrary n0 and tz, we wish to see
what values of n0 and n6 are consistent with equilibrium in the earlier research stage of
the game. In equilibrium, speculators cannot gain by studying a instead of b. Therefore,
ignoring integer problems, we must have EU0 =EU6:the expected utility from becoming
informed about a must equal the expected utility from becoming informed about b.
12In order to evaluate this equilibrium, we need a definition of informational efficiency.
Suppose there is a social planner who has the authority to choose n0 and n6, but takes
as given the market trading mechanism. We call an allocation (no,nb)"informationally
efficient" if it is the same as would be chosen by a social planner seeking to minimize
average variance of prices about true value. Average variance is simply
E(v—pl)+E(V—P2)
or,
E(v —A1F1)+ E(v —A2F2)2, (14)
where the expectation is taken over all realizations of a, b and t, and t2. The social
planner chooses aandn to minimize this expectation, given the )t,A2,F1 and F2 that
follow from this choice.
We prove the following proposition in the Appendix:
Proposition 1: If speculators have long horizons, the research equilibrium is infor-
mationally efficient.
The proof of the proposition proceeds roughly along the following lines. An increase in
a(andtherefore a decrease in nb) affects both A and Ft. However, a marginal increase in
At has only a second order effect on price informativeness. This is because for each realized
value of Ft, At already minimizes the forecast error, (v —.XF)2.Thus, the only first-order
effect of n0 is through its effect on Ft. One can show that an increase in n0, increases price
informativeness if and only if the expected utility from learning a exceeds the expected
utility from learning b. Thus, in choosing ,i0 to maximize price informativeness, the social
planner implicitly chooses the point at which the expected utility from learning a equals
the expected utility from learning b. Since this is also a condition of equilibrium, the
research equilibrium is informationally efficient.9
3.2. Equilibrium with short horizons
This section considers the extreme short-horizon case in which speculators always
°In a eirnple oneperiod veraion of thu model,inwhich all initial orderi are executed at the lame time, the analog of
Propocition 1 is more intuitive —thevariance of u— pis minimised by the competitive choice of research strategies.
13liquidate their holdings before news about v is released (a =0).After building intuition
for this case, we return to the more general case in which 0 < a < 1.
Consider equation (9) determining speculator i's trading strategy. In the short-horizon
case, the simplified version of this equation does not pin down a trading strategy for each
speculator. Indeed, equation (9) only tells us that if an a-speculator trades a non-zero
finite amount (so that the equation is met with equality), then
2A1
(15) "2 —"1




Equations (15) and (16) imply that the only way both types of speculators trade non-zero
amounts in the trading subgame is if n =. Ifna is greater than b, then bspeculators
would not trade on their information: q =0.The converse is true if n6 > a•
There are three candidate equilibria in research strategies: all speculators study a, all
study b,orhalf study a and half study b.Firstconsider the case in which all speculators
study a, n =n.Since (9) still does not pin down a trading strategy for an a-speculator
(only a condition Ofln,A2 and A1), we posit that a-speculators trade is given by qa =Saa.
We then solve for the equilibrium 8a•











Using (8), (17), (18), and (19) it is straightforward to show that a-speculators receive
strictly positive utility from trade.
14This characterizes the equilibrium of the trading sub-game if all speculators become
informed about a. Would any speculator wish to follow an a-speculator who deviated and
learned b?Theanswer is no: n0 would still be greater than n6, no b-speculator would
trade, and so his expected utility would be zero.
We can therefore support a research equilibrium in which all speculators become
informed about a. By an analogous argument we can also support a research equilibrium
in which all speculators become informed about b.Thus,there are two herding equilibria
in which all speculators choose the same strategies.
Finally, consider the only other possible research equilibrium: n0 =n,=. Although
expected utilities are equal, the allocation is not stable. Suppose a speculator deviated
and studied bratherthan a. Now, nb >n0and it does not pay for a-speculators to trade
on a; they all have zero expected utility. Every a-speculator would now want to learn b
insteadof a.
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: If speculators have short horizons (a =0),the only stable research
equilibria are herding equilibria in which either all speculators learn a or all speculators
learn b.
3.3.Equilibrium with intermediate horizons
The first two propositions focus on extreme cases in which speculative demands are
based either on very long or very short horizons. In practice, traders' demands are likely to
reflect both short- and long-run considerations. if, for example, there is uncertainty about
whether news will come out between a speculator's transactions, speculative demands will
contain both short- and long-horizon components. We therefore examine the intermediate
case in which 0 <a<1.
Recall that in any research equilibrium it is necessary that: 1) a-speculators satisfy
their first order conditions given in (9), and similarly for b-speculators; ii) market makers
set market depth according to equations (12) and (13); and iii) neither type of speculator
has an incentive to deviate and study the other source of information, If these three
15conditions are satisfied with a positive number of traders studying each type of information,
na > 0, it6 > 0, then we must have that the utility levels of both types of traders are equal,
EU0 =EU6.
In order to determine the equilibrium in the trading sub-game, we solve (9) for sym-
metric trading strategies. This yields:
= 2a
(20) A1 + aA2 + (Ai —A2 + 2aA2)
and a comparable expression for b-speculators. These expressions, along with equations
(12) and (13), form a set of four nonlinear equations in the unknowns, A1, A2, fi, and 66.
We have so far been unable to derive explicit solutions for these variables with 0 < a < 1.
Consequently, we have solved the model numerically. The solution exhibits the following
features which we believe are general.
Conjecture 1: if a> a there is a unique research equilibrium which is information-
ally efficient. If 0 < a < a*, then there are two stable research equilibria, both of which
are informationally inefficient.
Conjecture 1 indicates that interior as behave in ways similar to the extremes discussed
in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 above: for a large the equilibrium is unique and efficient, for a
small there are two herding equilibria both of which are inefficient. In addition, for small
a the utilities of a- and b-speculators are equal at the informationally efficient allocation
of research. However, just as in Section 3.2, this allocation is not a stable equilibrium.
Figures 1 and 2 help to understand the intuition behind the conjecture. They are
constructed for an example in which it =20,== = 1.In Figure 1, a =.25;in
Figure 2 a =.05.In this example a and b are equally informative about v. Consequently,
it is informationally efficient for half the speculators to study a and half to study b.10
On the figures' vertical axes are the levels of expected utility for a-and b-speculators.
On the horizontal axes are the number of speculators informed about a, it0, holding the
total number of speculators it fixed.
'°None of thequalitativeproperties of the conjecture appear to depend on the specific parameter. used in constructing the
Figure..
16Figure 1 shows the expected utility levels of a- and b-speculators for a "large" value of
a. Expected utility is clearly decreasing in the number of similarly-informed traders; for
large values of a the usual "contrarian" effects in research dominate. The equilibrium with
EU0 =EU6occurs at n0 =. Tosee that this allocation is stable, and hence an equilib-
rium, suppose that more than half the speculators choose to study a, so that n0 > n6. The
figure shows that this conjectured allocation leads to EUa < EU6. Individual speculators
would therefore strictly prefer to study b, pushing the distribution of information back
toward n0 =n6.An allocation in which n0 > n6 cannot be an equilibrium, nor could
an allocation in which nb > no. In sum, even though speculators may trade out at short
horizons before new informed speculators arrive, the negative spillovers and strategic sub-
stitutability effects can dominate, yielding an equilibrium that is similar to those in other
information-based asset pricing models.
Figure 2 depicts the corresponding levels of utility when a is small. Expected utility
is no longer monotonic in the number of similarly-informed traders. Indeed, it is increasing
(which implies that the positive spillovers and strategic complementarities are dominant)
when the allocation of information is approximately symmetric.
There are now three interior points at which EU0 =EU6in Figure 2. The efficient
allocation n0 =isnot a stable equilibrium: if a small number of b-speculators deviated
to study a, others would want to follow suit since EU0 is positively sloped in the neigh-
borhood of .Incontrast, the two other intersection points in Figure 2, designated as A
and B, are equilibria. To see this, consider the A equilibrium. If a small number of addi-
tional b-speculators deviated to study a, others would not want to follow suit since EU0 is
downward sloping in the neighborhood of A. Similarly, if a small number of a-speculators
considered deviating to study b, they would make themselves worse off, and therefore other
a-speculators would not wish to deviate. These herding equilibria are clearly inefficient.
Note also that expected utility is much lower than at the efficient symmetric allocation. If
a is smaller than in Figure 2, then the herding equilibria become more extreme, eventually
reaching the points n0 =nand n6 =n—aswe found in Section 3.2, where a was zero.
If a is sufficiently large, then the herding equilibria eventually disappear, and the efficient
17allocation becomes the unique equilibrium.
4.Tradingon Noise
In the discussion above, we assumed that a and b are components of v —eachpiece of
information is actually helpful in predicting fundamental value. In this section, we relax
this assumption. We ask whether the informational spillovers are strong enough to make
possible herding on information that is completely unrelated to fundamentals.
Suppose that n traders know v and that n =n—rtraders know a variable c
which is independent of fundamentals. Utility of v-speculators is essentially as discussed
in earlier sections: it is given by (5), with a replaced everywhere by v. Similarly, the ith
v-speculator's —or"fundamentalist's" —demandis given by an expression analogous to




Thecomparable expression for the "chartist" trader who learns c is slightly different.11
Because c is uncorrelated with v, the ith chartist's expected utility conditional on observing
c is given by:
= qt {_aAl+ A2(qi+ - 1))+(1((2 - A1)+ Ai(4 -q))},
(22)
which can be obtained from (5) by replacing a with c and noting that c is independent of
V.
It is clear from (22) that chartist traders will not want to trade if a is sufficiently
near one. if there is a high probability that speculators will sell out at a price equal
to fundamentals, v, then chartists —whocannot forecast any component of v —would
consistently lose money if they were to trade. Thus, chartists can participate in a trading
sub-game only if there is a sufficiently high probability that they will be selling out before
all information becomes public. 'Chartiemie one example of trading on information unrelated to underlying value, or noiee. For a different model of the
interaction between chartista and fundaznentali.taseeFrankel and Froot (1989)
18Assuming a symmetric equilibrium in the trading sub-game (q =4),the first-order
condition for the ith chartist implies:
A1+czA2 — 23
A2—Aj—2aA22
As in the example of Section 3.2 in which a =0,the speculators' first-order conditions do
not pin down the amount they trade.
The market makers' problem is slightly changed, because v covaries only with the
component of the order flow attributable to fundamentalists. Thus, market makers now
set market depth parameters, A1 and A2, according to:
A —cov(v,Fj]— 280nc 222 222 2' 24
var[F1]Sna + S + 4c€
A =cov[v,Eihj= 2önc
(25) 2
var[-1]6flC + 6nC + 2o'
Of course, as before we have that with informed trading 0 < A1 <A2 < 1.
As we have already mentioned, chartists cannot trade profitably in the pure long-
horizon case, a =1.As a result, when a =1,there is a unique research equilibrium in
which all speculators study fundamentals, n, =n.Next, consider the pure short-horizon
case in which a =0.In Proposition 2 above we found that the only equilibria in the trading
sub-game are where all active speculators trade on the same information. With chartists
and fundamentalists, it is clear that if all informed traders know v, they will trade with
demands given by (21) and a =0.However, there can be no active trading equilibrium
when all speculators are chartists. To see why, note that if all n speculators know nothing
about fundamentals, then the order flow is completely uninformative about v, and market
makers set p =P2=0.It follows that chartist trade cannot generate positive profits.
Thus, when a =0,there is a unique equilibrium in which speculators trade — theefficient
equilibrium of v=
Althoughit is not possible to support chartist trading with either pure short- or long-
horizons, chartists will wish to trade for a range of intermediate horizons. For small, but
positive a, speculators have a chance of trading out at v. Fundamentalists therefore have
19an incentive to trade, regardless of their number. However, once there are fundamentalists
actively trading, the order flow is at least partly informative about v, so that A2 >A,>0.
Thiscan create room for chartists to trade profitably, provided there are enough of them
to move the price with c in the short run.'2 We prove the following proposition in the
appendix:
Proposition 3: if n > n and a is sufficiently small, then there exists an equilibrium
in the trading sub-game in which both chartists and fundamentalists submit positive mar-
ket orders and earn positive expected profits (EUC' > 0). Since chartists trade actively, this
equilibrium is inefficient. There is a second trading equilibrium in which fundamentalists
trade actively, but chartists do not. This latter equilibrium is efficient given n,,.
The positive spillovers and strategic complementarities allow chartists in the aggregate
to bootstrap their way into profitable trading. Given that other chartists are trading, each
expects the price to move with c and therefore each trades actively.13
Proposition 3 suggests that if a large enough number of traders are endowed with
information about c, they will trade on it and earn profits. It does not say, however, that
speculators will actually choose to study c if they could instead learn v. On the basis of
numerical simulations, we state the following conjecture:14
Conjecture 2: If a is sufficiently small, then there exists an inefficient research
equilibrium in which rt,, traders choose to study v and rz0 > n traders choose to study
c. For all values of a there exists an efficient research equilibrium in which all speculators
choose to study v.
Figures 3 and 4 help to understand the intuition behind this conjecture. Once again,
the vertical axes measure traders' expected utility levels, EU,, and EUc, and the horizontal
axes measure the number of chartist speculators n, given it. As before, the figures are
'2Thepresence of chartist trade itself makes the order flow lees informative ahout a, and therefore increases the aggressiveness
with which funda,nentaliete trade. If there are too many fundamentalists (a sufficient condition for which would be n, > n)
they will trade so aggresoively as to make it unprofitable for chartists to trade at all (U:￿ 0). '° potential fur traders who reduce the informational efficiency of prices to "create their own Space" for profitable activity
is also eeen in 5tein (its?)andDeLong et. al. (1990a).
"Numerical solutions were required because we have not been able to derive explicitly the roots of the polynomial expression
given by EU=EU..
20constructed for an example in which n =20,a =cr== 1;in Figure 3, a =.015,and
in Figure 4 a =.005.Note that we graph only the relevant range, nc >
Figure3 demonstrates the case in which horizons are relatively long-term, i.e., a is
relatively large. It is immediately clear that EU,, >EU,regardless of the number of
traders informed about each. Nevertheless, chartists receive positive utility from trading
and therefore trade actively, provided that n is sufficiently greater than nv. However,
once we allow speculators to choose which source of information to study, none chooses c.
The only research equilibrium is n, =0,where all traders choose to study v.
Figure 4 is a comparable graph for the case in which a is relatively small. Here it is
unlikely that new outside information arrives before the current v and c traders sell. As
a result the informational complementarities are a more important factor in determining
expected utility levels. As before, there is an efficient research equilibrium (not shown on
the graph) where all traders choose to study v, c =0.Note, however, that if speculators
conjecture that a majority will become chartists, then there are two other points, shown
in the graph, at which expected utilities are equalized. The point with fewer chartists
is an unstable allocation: since EU is upward sloping at this point, v-speculators would
wish to emulate an initial v-speculator who deviated and studied c. By contrast, the point
labelled C in the figure is an equilibrium. Here, similar deviations would not induce others
to follow. Interestingly, at point C, n, is much greater than flu:ifc is studied at all in
equilibrium, the majority of traders will want to study it, even though c is completely
unrelated to fundamental value.
215. Discussion
5.1. Inefficiencies in markets with short-term trading
In typical models of informed trading, informational externalities are negative. In such
models, which effectively feature speculators with long horizons, the returns to acquiring
information fall as the number of other identically-informed traders increase. Negative
externalities of this sort encourage contrarian information acquisition.
In contrast, our results are driven by positive informational spillovers: as more spec-
ulators study a given piece of information, more of that information disseminates into
the market, and therefore, the profits from learning that information early increase. This
implies that profit-maximizing speculators may choose to ignore some information about
fundamentals. In equilibrium, speculators herd: they acquire "too much" of some types of
information and "too little" of others.
There are other classes of models in which short-term speculation can lead to in-
efficiencies. The first —thatof fads and noise trading —focuseson the implications of
less-than-fully rational traders. DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman (1990b), for ex-
ample, features "positive- feedback" traders who predictably extrapolate past price trends.
In their model, rational speculators can increase their overall profits by taking advantage
of the short-horizon extrapolation of positive-feedback traders. In doing so they drive the
asset price away from its fundamental value, further increasing their profits at the expense
of positive-feedback traders.15
A second class of models in which inefficiencies arise from short-term speculative
horizons is that of rational bubbles. These models employ only rational speculators, but
prices nevertheless exhibit extraneous fluctuations. Traders have short-term horizons in
that they are not able to enforce infinite-horizon arbitrage conditions. As a result, prices
may contain an extraneous component which grows at the discount rate. If this component
is present, the market will be "stuck" on an inefficient path along which prices eventually
explode. The efficient equilibrium is also possible: if the initial price is equal to its present
value level, then the bubble can never get started.
10Frankel and Froot (19s9) present a model in which optimizing portfolio managers must choose between the advice of
rational fundamentals traders and chartists.
22One problem with this latter type of model is that it offers no mechanism for what
drives the market away from efficiency. Indeed, in bubble models sensible candidates
would if anything drive the economy toward the efficient allocation. The infinite-horizon
transactions that are ruled out by assumption in such models become hugely profitable as
the bubble —thewedge between prices and the present value of fundamentals —explodes.
It is easy to believe that agents facing very large wedges would attempt such transactions,
which by induction would eliminate bubble-type inefficiencies from the start. Our approach
may be preferable in this regard, in that the positive spillovers drive the market away from
the efficient outcome.
5.2. An infinite-horizon extension
As noted in Section 2, there would be no herd behavior in the current formulation of
the model if were certain that a new group of informed speculators will enter at date 3.
However, our model could be extended so as to handle overlapping generations of informed
traders without losing the principal results. One possibility is an infinite-horizon, steady-
state approach which we describe briefly.
Suppose that at the beginning of each period there are kpiecesof information that
speculators can study. At the end of the period, one of these pieces of information will be
publicly announced, although it is not known initially which it will be. At the beginning of
the next period a new piece of information, which was previously impossible to learn about,
is then available to be studied. For example, suppose that a company is always engaged in
kR&Dprojects, about which speculators may learn. In each period, one project reaches
a conclusion and its results are revealed publicly, although speculators cannot predict in
advance which project it will be. In the next period a new project is begun in its place.
Under these circumstances, herding equilibria like those described above can arise.
Suppose that each generation herds on a single piece of information. At the time they
make this choice, they are uncertain about what the next generation will happen to herd
on. To see that this is an equilibrium, consider an individual speculator's incentive to
deviate from the herd by studying a different piece of information. He can profit from the
deviation only if the piece of information that he alone studies is publicly revealed or if
23the next generation herds on it. If kislarge, neither outcome is likely, and his incentive
to deviate is small.16
5.3. Empirical implications
Because the mechanism driving our results is different from that in related models,
it has different empirical implications. First, our model implies that prices will follow
a random walk: no publicly available information will help in predicting future price
changes. (Of course, informed traders can partially predict future price changes because
their information has not been impounded fully into prices.)
Second, the model can help to make sense of the often puzzling behavior of many
market participants. In practice, short-term traders often use forecasting methods that
appear at best tangentially related to fundamental values. Chartism is one example of such
a method. Economists and even traders seem to agree that there are better methods of
determining long-run value. Yet, the very fact that a large number of traders use chartist
models may be enough to generate positive profits for those traders who already know how
to chart. Even stronger, when such methods are popular, it is optimal for speculators to
choose to chart. They rationally ignore opportunities to learn about v, the realization of
which is a distant "five steps ahead." Such an equilibrium persists even if chartist methods
contain no relevant long-term information.
The herding equilibria also suggest that traders may focus on different variables at
different times. For example, in the infinite-horizon model above, each new generation
of speculators switches to studying an entirely different source of information. This kind
of behavior sounds reminiscent of markets which track certain variables closely for short
periods of time. Of course, if the underlying valuation model is changing, one would
expect this type of behavior anyway, but it seems to us that the market's romance with
individual variables is often extremely brief and only tenuously connected with underlying
fundamentals.
5.4. The Welfare Effects of Short Speculative Horizons
Short speculative horizons can affect social welfare through two distinct channels.
'6Note that eveninthu inflntte-hiaon model, the herding equilibria are in no sense bubbles— theprice is always equal to
the expectation of preeent value (conditional on some information set)andno transversality conditions areviolated.
24First, short-term trading can, as we have demonstrated, have a direct negative impact on
the informational quality of asset prices. This in turn can lead to less-informed allocational
decisions if agents look to asset prices to guide production decisions.
Second, short-term trading can induce managers to spend too much time improving
performance measures that the market happens to focus on and too little time on measures
that the market ignores. To see this suppose that the manager is compensated on the basis
of the firm's current stock price and that he can allocate his time between trying to increase
the mean of a (say, current earnings) or of 6 (the benefits from R&D). Suppose also that
long-run value is maximized if the manager devotes half his time to each.
If speculators all herd on a and none choose to study 6, then the manager will spend
all his time on a and ignore 6. In this sense, managers have no choice but to sacrifice long-
run value if they are to boost the current stock price.17 Short-sighted speculative horizons
may therefore drive short-sighted managerial behavior. Note that this inefficiency does
not stem from market mispricing: the stock price is indeed the present value of expected
fundamentals. As a result, the usual tests of "weak-form" efficiency may not be able to
uncover the research inefficiencies that drive short-run managerial behavior.
'7Stein (1989) preeentemodel inwhich manager, face a similar tradeoff, except that he assumes that biiinherently
unobservable. Themodel abovedemonstrates that evenif the marketcouldlearn about 8, it maynot choose to do so.
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277. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We can write the social planner's problem as:
1 21 2 mna,noE(v —A1F1)+ E(v —A2F2)
Thechoice of a and rib affects Ai, A2, F1, and F2. Thus, the derivative of expression
(A.1) with respect to a (recognizing that n0 =n—bis given by:
E ((v —A1F1)(1F1+(qa
— +E ((v —A2F2)(F2+ (q0 —
gb)))
.(A.2)
The market depth parameter At is chosen so that the price Pt =AtFt,is the best
forecast of value, i.e., A minimizes E(v —AF)2,t =1,2.Thus, the optimal At sets
E(v —AtFt)Ft=0.(Note, this equation implies At =cov(v,Ft)/var(Ft)which we used in
solving for At. Using this expression, (A.2) becomes:
((v —A1F1)+ (v —A2F2))q —((v
—A1F1)+ (v —A2F2))q. (A.3)
The first term is the expected utility from learning a and the second term is the expected
utility from learning b. These are equal in the research equilibrium so the social planner
maximizes the informativeness of prices by choosing the equilibrium allocation.
Proof of Proposition 3.Thefirst-order condition for c-speculators, (23), can be
rewritten as A2 =kA1,where k = >1. Using this expression, the first-order cOflc+
conditionfor v-speculators (21), and the market makers' optimal forecasts in (24) and
(25), we can solve for the four endogenous variables, ö,, &,A1and A2 as functions of a,


























Note that as n,approachesn,, from above, the term k1 becomes infinite. From (A.4)
this would imply that v-speculators become infinitely aggressive, and from (A.5) that the
aggressiveness of c-speculators would fall below zero. If both c- and v-speculators are to
trade we require that both ö and 8,, be positive (this is equivalent to requiring that EU
and EU,, be positive). Algebra verifies that a sufficient condition for this to be true is that
n >n,,and that a <1/2.This proves the first part of Proposition 3.
if nc <ne,,atrading equilibrium exists in which n =0.To see this use (A.4), (A.6)
and (A.7) with n, =0to show that ö >0,and therefore that EU,, >0.This proves the
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